# Applying Predicate Detection to Discrete Optimization Problems 

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## Motivation

Consider the following problems:

- Shortest Path Problem:

Input: a weighted directed graph and a source vertex
Output: Least Cost of reaching any vertex $i$
Dijkstra's algorithm for graph with non-negative weights, Bellman-Ford algorithm for graphs with no negative cycles

- Stable Marriage Problem:

Input: ordered preferences of $n$ men and $n$ women
Output: Man-optimal stable marriage
Gale-Shapley's algorithm

- Assignment Problem:

Input: $n$ items, $n$ bidders with valuation for items
Output: Least market clearing prices
Hungarian Algorithm (or Gale-Demange-Sotomayor's Auction)
Could there be a single algorithm that solves all of these problems?
Lattice-Linear Predicate (LLP) Algorithm

## Other Applications of LLP

- Housing Allocation Problem:

Input: $n$ agents, $n$ houses, initial endowment, preference list of agents
Output: allocation of houses such that there is no blocking group Gale's Top Trading Cycle Algorithm

- Minimum Spanning Tree Problem:

Input: undirected weighted graph
Output: spanning tree with that minimizes sum of weight of edges
Prim's Algorithm, Boruvka' Algorithm

- Horn Satisfiability:

Input: A boolean formula in Horn form
Output: Least satisfying assignment, if any Horn's Satisfiability Algorithm

## Outline of the Talk

- What are Lattice-Linear Predicates (LLP)?
- LLP Detection Algorithm
- Applications
- Enumerating All Satisfying Global States


## Steps of Using LLP Algorithm

- Step 1: Model the underlying search space. A Distributive Lattice of State Vectors. The order on the lattice is based on the optimization objective of the problem.
- Step 2: Define the feasibility predicate $B$. An element is feasible if it satisfies constraints of the problem
- Step 3: Check whether the feasibility predicate $B$ is Lattice-Linear. If $B$ is lattice-linear, LLP Algorithm will return the optimal feasible solution.


## Step 1: Modeling the underlying search space

Model the problem as $n$ processes choosing their component in a vector of size $n$. The choice for a single process is total ordered.

computation: poset $(E, \rightarrow)$
candidate solution: a possible global state of the system.

## Consistent Global State



A subset $G$ of $E$ is a consistent global state if

$$
\forall e, f \in E:(f \in G) \wedge(e \rightarrow f) \Rightarrow(e \in G)
$$

The set of all consistent global states forms a finite distributive lattice.

## Step 1: Order on the underlying space



$(L, \leq)$ : Underlying Search Space
$L$ : set of all consistent global state vectors
Order on Global State $G \leq H$ iff for all $i: G[i] \leq H[i]$.
meet of two global states: $K=G \sqcap H=\min (G, H)$
join of two global states: $K=G \sqcup H=\max (G, H)$ meet distributes over join.
$(L, \leq)$ is a distributive lattice.

## Step 1: Examples

$G$ : Global State Vector where $G[i]$ is the component for process $i$.

- Shortest Path: $G[i]$ : cost of reaching vertex $i$ from the source vertex initially 0
- Stable Marriage: $G[i]$ : index in the preference list for man $i$ initially $1 / /$ top choice
- Market Clearing Prices: $G[i]$ : price of item $i$ initially 0


## Step 2: Defining Feasibility Predicate $B$

A global state $G$ satisfies $B$ iff $G$ represents a feasible solution.

- Shortest Path: All nodes most have a parent node. For every vertex $j$ (except source): there exists a vertex $i$ such that $G[j] \geq G[i]+w[i, j]$.
- Stable Marriage: Every man must be matched to a different woman and there must not be any blocking pair.
- Market Clearing Prices: There is no overdemanded item at that pricing vector.


## Step 2: Defining Feasibility Predicate Formally

- Shortest Path: Every non-source node has a parent. For any node $j \neq 0$,

$$
\exists i \in \operatorname{pre}(j): G[j] \geq G[i]+w[i, j]
$$

- Stable Marriage: Every man must be matched to a different woman and there must not be any blocking pair. For any man $j$, let $z=\operatorname{mpref}[j][G[j]] ; / / c u r r e n t$ woman assigned to man $j$

$$
\neg \exists i: \exists k \leq G[i]:(z=\operatorname{mpref}[i][k]) \wedge(\operatorname{rank}[z][i]<\operatorname{rank}[z][j]))
$$

- Market Clearing Prices: There is no overdemanded item at that pricing vector. For any item $j$,

$$
\neg \exists J: \text { minimalOverDemanded }(J, G) \wedge(j \in J)
$$

## Lattice-Linearity for Predicate Detection



Forbidden State The state at $P_{i}$ is forbidden at $G$ with respect to $B$ if unless $P_{i}$ is advanced $B$ cannot become true.

$$
\text { forbidden }(G, i, B) \equiv \forall H: G \subseteq H:(G[i]=H[i]) \Rightarrow \neg B(H)
$$

Lattice-Linear Predicates A predicate $B$ is lattice-linear if for all consistent cuts $G$,

$$
\neg B(G) \Rightarrow \exists i: \text { forbidden }(G, i, B)
$$

Examples: Conjunctive Predicates: $I_{1} \wedge I_{2} \wedge \ldots \wedge I_{n}$, Feasible Path, Stable Matching, Market Clearing Prices, Minimum Spanning Tree, Housing Core, Horn Formulas

## Examples of Lattice-Linear Predicates

- A conjunctive predicate
$I_{1} \wedge I_{2} \wedge \ldots \wedge I_{n}$, where $I_{i}$ is local to $P_{i}$.
Suppose $G$ is not feasible. Then, there exists $j$ such that $l_{j}$ is false in
$G$. The index $j$ is forbidden in $G$.
- Shortest Path

Any $j$ such that $v_{j}$ does not have a parent,
( $\forall i \in \operatorname{pre}(j): G[j]<G[i]+w[i, j])$ is forbidden in $G$.

- Stable Marriage
$j$ is forbidden in $G$ if
$\exists i: \exists k \leq G[i]:(z=m p r e f[i][k]) \wedge(\operatorname{rank}[z][i]<\operatorname{rank}[z][j]))$
- Market Clearing Price
$(\neg \exists J$ : minimalOverDemanded $(J, G) \wedge(j \in J))$
Any $j$ in a minimal overDemanded set is forbidden.


## Example of Predicates that are not Lattice-Linear

Example 1: $B(G) \equiv x+y \geq 1$


Example 2: $B(G) \equiv G$ is a matching.


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## Detecting Lattice-Linear Predicates

(Advancement Property) There exists an efficient (polynomial time) algorithm to determine the forbidden state.

Theorem
[Chase and Garg 95] Any lattice-linear predicate that satisfies advancement property can be detected efficiently.

## LLP Algorithm

How much to advance: $j$ is forbidden in $G$ until $\alpha$ iff

$$
\forall H \in L: H \geq G:(H[j]<\alpha) \Rightarrow \neg B(H) .
$$

vector function getLeastFeasible( $T$ : vector, $B$ : predicate)
$/ / T$ : top element of the lattice
var $G$ : vector of reals initially $\forall i: G[i]=0$;
while $\exists j$ : forbidden $(G, j, B)$ do
for all $j$ such that forbidden $(G, j, B)$ in parallel:
if $(\alpha(G, j, B)>T[j])$ then return null; else $G[j]:=\alpha(G, j, B)$;
endwhile;
return $G$; // the optimal solution

## LLP Algorithm: Stable Marriage Problem

$P_{j}:$

```
var G: array[1..n] of 1..n;
```

input: mpref[i,k]: int for all $i, k ; / /$ men preferences $\operatorname{rank}[k][i]:$ int for all $k, i$; // women ranking
init: $G[j]:=1$;
always: $w=\operatorname{mpref}[j][G[j]]$;
forbidden:
$(\exists i: \exists k \leq G[i]:(w=\operatorname{mpref}[i][k]) \wedge(\operatorname{rank}[w][i]<\operatorname{rank}[w][j]))$
advance: $G[j]:=G[j]+1$;
Slightly more general than Gale-Shapley Algorithm:
instead of starting from $(1,1, \ldots, 1)$, can start from any choice vector.

## LLP Algorithm: Shortest Path Problem

input: pre(j): list of $1 . . n$;
$w[i, j]$ : positive int for all $i \in \operatorname{pre}(j)$
$s: 1 . . n ; / /$ source node;
init: $G[j]:=0$;
always:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { parent }[j, i]=(i \in \operatorname{pre}(j)) \wedge(G[j] \geq G[i]+w[i, j]) ; \\
& \text { fixed }[j]=(j=s) \vee(\exists i: \operatorname{parent}[j, i] \wedge \text { fixed }[i]) \\
& Q=\{(G[i]+w[i, k]) \mid(i \in \operatorname{pre}(k)) \wedge \text { fixed }(i) \wedge \neg \text { fixed }(k)\} ;
\end{aligned}
$$

forbidden: $\neg$ fixed $[j]$
advance: $G[j]:=\max \{\min Q, \min \{G[i]+w[i, j] \mid i \in \operatorname{pre}(j)\}\}$
By ignoring the second part of advance, we can get Dijkstra's algorithm.

## LLP Algorithm: Shortest Path Problem Revisited

Assume no negative cost cycle.

```
input: pre(j): list of 1..n;
w[i,j]: int for all i}\in\operatorname{pre}(j
init: if (j=s) then G[j]:= 0 else G[j]:= maxint;
forbidden: G[j] > min{G[i]+w[i,j]|i\in\operatorname{pre}(j)}
advance: G[j]:=min{G[i]+w[i,j]|i\in\operatorname{pre}(j)}
```

Lattice is reversed: the bottom element is (maxint, maxint, ..., maxint) This is just Bellman-Ford's algorithm.

## LLP Algorithm: Market Clearing Prices

input: $v[b, i]$ : int for all $b, i$
init: $G[j]:=0$;
always: $E=\{(k, b) \mid \forall i:(v[b, k]-G[k]) \geq(v[b, i]-G[i])\}$;

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \operatorname{demand}\left(U^{\prime}\right)=\left\{k \mid \exists b \in U^{\prime}:(k, b) \in E\right\} ; \\
& \text { overDemanded }(J) \equiv \exists U^{\prime} \subseteq U:\left(\operatorname{demand}\left(U^{\prime}\right)=J\right) \wedge\left(|J|<\left|U^{\prime}\right|\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

forbidden: $\exists J$ : minimal - OverDemanded $(J) \wedge(j \in J)$ advance: $G[j]:=G[j]+1$;

This is just Demange-Gale-Sotomayor exact auction algorithm.

## Properties of LLP Predicates

## Lemma

Let $B$ be any boolean predicate defined on a lattice $L$ of vectors.

- Let $f: L \rightarrow \mathrm{R}_{\geq 0}$ be any monotone function defined on the lattice $L$ of vectors of $R_{\geq 0}$. Consider the predicate $B \equiv G[i] \geq f(G)$ for some fixed $i$. Then, $B$ is lattice-linear.
- Let $L_{B}$ be the subset of the lattice $L$ of the elements that satisfy $B$. If $B$ is lattice-linear then $L_{B}$ is closed under meets.
- If $B_{1}$ and $B_{2}$ are lattice-linear then $B_{1} \wedge B_{2}$ is also lattice-linear.


## Constrained Optimization

- least stable marriage such that regret of Peter is less than or equal to regret of John
- least feasible path such that the cost of reaching $x$ equals cost of reaching $y$
- least clearing prices such that item $_{1}$ is priced at least 5 more than item $_{2}$.
All of the additional constraints are also lattice-linear.


## Lemma

LLP can be adapted to find the least vector $G$ that satisfies $B_{1} \wedge B_{2}$ for any lattice-linear predicates $B_{1}, B_{2}$.

## Proof.

The algorithm $L L P$ can be used with the following changes:
forbidden $\left(G, j, B_{1} \wedge B_{2}\right) \equiv$ forbidden $\left(G, j, B_{1}\right) \vee$ forbidden $\left(G, j, B_{2}\right)$, and $\alpha\left(G, j, B_{1} \wedge B_{2}\right)=\max \left\{\alpha\left(G, j, B_{1}\right), \alpha\left(G, j, B_{2}\right)\right\}$.

## Meet Closure of Feasible Predicates

Theorem
[Chase and Garg 95] A predicate B is lattice-linear implies that it is meet-closed (in the lattice of all consistent cuts).

Lattice-Linearity implies

- If $G$ and $H$ are feasible cost vectors, then so is $G \sqcap H$.
- If $G$ and $H$ are stable marriage choice vectors, then so is $G \sqcap H$.
- If $G$ and $H$ are market clearing prices, then so is $G \sqcap H$.


## Dual of Lattice-Linearity

```
reverse-forbidden (G,i,B)\equiv\forallH\inL:H\leqG:(G[i]=H[i])=>\negB(H).
B is dual-lattice-linear iff:
\forallG\inL:\negB(G) => \existsi: reverse-forbidden(G,i,B).
BstableMarriage and }\mp@subsup{B}{\mathrm{ marketClearing are also dual-lattice-linear.}}{
#
```

- the set of stable marriages and market clearing prices are also closed under joins
- one can traverse the lattice backwards to find the woman-optimal stable marriage or the greatest market clearing prices.

Note: $B_{\text {shortestPath }}$ is not dual-lattice-linear.

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## Enumerating All Feasible Solutions

Assume that $B$ is lattice-linear as well as dual-lattice-linear.


$\square$
global state : global states that satisfy the predicate

- $L_{B}$ (the subset of elements in $L$ that satisfy $B$ ) forms a sublattice of $L$
- $L_{B}$ is a distributive lattice.

Slicing: Can we represent $L_{B}$ concisely? [Mittal and Garg 01]

## Join-irreducible Elements

join-irreducible element: cannot be represented as join of two other elements

: states that satisfy the predicate
$\square$ : join-irreducible element of the sublattice induced by the predicate
Theorem
[Birkhoff's Representation Theorem] A distributive lattice can be recovered exactly from the set of its join-irreducible elements.

## Algorithm to find All Join-Irreducible Elements

```
for all e\inE:
    compute J(B,e)
```

$J(B, e)$ : the minimum global state of $(E, \leq)$ that

- satisfies $B$, and
- contains e

Feasible predicate: $B_{e}(G) \equiv B(G) \wedge(e \in G)$
Observation: $B_{e}$ is a conjunction of two lattice-linear predicates.
We can use LLP algorithm to find the least global state satisfying $J(B, e)$

## Applications of Slicing

- Constrained Stable Marriages: We get a generalization of rotation poset [Irving and Gusfield].
- Constrained Market Clearing Prices: A poset that captures all integral market clearing prices.


## Conclusions

## How to Solve Many Combinatorial Optimization Problems

Find the least feasible element

- View State space as the set of consistent global states
- Each process starts with the most desirable choice and moves to less desirable
- Define a "feasibility" predicate $B$
- Check if $B$ satisfies the lattice-linearity condition

Other algorithms as special cases of the LLP Algorithm:

- Gale's Top Trading Cycle Algorithm,
- Prim's MST Algorithm,
- Horn's satisfiability algorithm,
- Johnson's algorithm to transform graphs with negative cost edges


## Future Work

- Techniques when the feasibility predicate is not lattice-linear.

