IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems,
submitted Feb. 11, 2017.
GNSS Signal Authentication via Power and Distortion Monitoring
Kyle D. Wesson (1),
Jason N. Gross (2),
Todd E. Humphreys (1) and
Brian L. Evans (1)
(1) Wireless Networking and Communications Group,
The University of Texas at Austin,
Austin, Texas USA
(2) Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering,
West Virginia University,
Morgantown, West Virginia USA
UT Austin Radionavigation Laboratory
We propose a simple low-cost technique that enables civil Global
Positioning System (GPS) receivers and other civil global navigation
satellite system (GNSS) receivers to reliably detect spoofing and jamming.
The technique, which we call the Power-Distortion detector, classifies
received signals as interference-free, multipath-afflicted, spoofed, or
jammed according to observations of received power and correlation
It does not depend on external hardware or a network connection and
can be readily implemented on many receivers via a firmware update.
Crucially, the detector can with high probability distinguish low-power
spoofing from ordinary multipath.
In testing against over 25 high-quality empirical data sets yielding
>900,000 separate detection tests, the detector correctly alarms
on all malicious spoofing and jamming attacks while maintaining a
<0.2% single-channel false alarm rate.
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Last Updated 02/16/17.