

# Goals of the lecture

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- Time domain vs Causality domain
- Lamport's Mutual Exclusion Algorithm
- Formal Verification
  - Key Lemmas
  - Safety
  - Liveness
  - Fairness

References: Lamport 79,  
Garg and Tomlinson 94

# Time domain vs Causality domain

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- most problems require causality domain
  - accounts for variable execution schedule
- problems in causality domain easier
  - mutual exclusion
  - ordering of messages
  - observing a global property

## Properties of the Mutual Exclusion Algorithm


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- a fixed number of processes
- a shared resource called the critical section (CS).
- Task is to coordinate processes.
- Requirements are:

**Safety:** Two processes should not use the CS simultaneously.

**Liveness:** Every request for the CS is eventually granted.

**Fairness:** Requests must be granted in the order they are made.



## Formal Specification

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Lamport's algorithm assumes that all channels are FIFO

$$s \prec t \wedge s \rightsquigarrow u \wedge t \rightsquigarrow v \Rightarrow \neg(v \prec u)$$

- $req(s) = P_{s.p}$  has requested the critical section
- $cs(s) = P_{s.p}$  has permission to enter the critical section in  $s$
- Cooperation assumption:

$$cs(s) \Rightarrow (\exists t : s \prec t : \neg req(t))$$

## Formal Requirements

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$$s \parallel t \Rightarrow \neg(cs(s) \wedge cs(t)) \quad \text{(Safety)}$$

$$req(s) \Rightarrow (\exists t :: s \prec t \wedge cs(t)) \quad \text{(Liveness)}$$

$$next\_cs(s) = \min\{t \mid s \prec t \wedge cs(t)\}$$

$$req\_start(s) = req(s) \wedge \neg req(s.prev)$$

$req\_start(s) = P_{s.p}$  made a request for the CS in state  $s$ .

$$(req\_start(s) \wedge req\_start(t) \wedge s \rightarrow t) \Rightarrow next\_cs(s) \rightarrow next\_cs(t) \quad \text{(Fairness)}$$

- $next\_cs(s)$  and  $next\_cs(t)$  exist due to liveness.
- $next\_cs(s)$  and  $next\_cs(t)$  are not concurrent due to safety.

# Informal Specification of the Mutual Exclusion Algorithm

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- **request CS**: send a timestamped message to all other processes and add a timestamped request to the queue.
- **On receiving a request**: the request and its timestamp is stored in the queue and an acknowledgment is returned.
- **To release the CS**: send a release message to all other processes.
- **On receiving a “release”**: delete the corresponding request from the queue.

$$P_3 \circ \overline{req(21, 1), \dots}$$

$$\overline{req(21, 1), ack(24, 2), ack(25, 3), \dots} \quad P_1 \circ \quad P_2 \circ \overline{req(21, 1), \dots}$$

## Informal Specification [Contd.]

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- can access CS if
  - it has a request in the queue with timestamp  $t$ , and
  - $t$  is less than all other requests in the queue, and
  - it has received a message from every other process with timestamp greater than  $t$ .

$$P_3 \circ \overline{req(21, 1), req(24, 2) \dots}$$

$$\overline{req(21, 1), req(24, 2), ack(25, 3), \dots} \quad P_1 \circ \quad P_2 \circ \overline{req(21, 1), req(24, 2) \dots}$$

## Formal Description

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- Local variables in each state  $s$ :
  - $s.q[1..n]$  : integer initially  $\infty$
  - $s.v$  : DDClock
- To request the critical section in  $t$  where  $s \prec_1 t$ :
  - $t.q[t.p] = s.v[t.p]$
  - for all  $j : j \neq t.p$  : send “request” to  $P_j$
- On receiving “request” in state  $t$  sent from state  $u$  ( $u \rightsquigarrow t$ ):
  - $t.q[u.p] = u.q[u.p]$
  - send ack to  $u.p$
- To release the critical section in state  $t$ :
  - $t.q[t.p] = \infty$
  - for all  $j \neq t.p$ , send “release” to  $P_j$
- On receiving “release” sent from state  $u$ :
  - $t.q[u.p] = \infty$



## Formal Description [Contd.]

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State  $s$  has permission to access the critical section when

- there is a request from  $P_{s.p}$  with timestamp less than all other requests
- and  $P_{s.p}$  has received a message from every other process with a timestamp greater than the timestamp of its own request.

Formal description of  $CS(s) \equiv$

$$\forall j : j \neq s.p : (s.q[s.p], s.p) < (s.v[j], j) \wedge (s.q[s.p], s.p) < (s.q[j], j).$$

## Proof of Correctness

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We define the predicate


$$msg(s, t) \equiv (\exists u, t' : u \rightsquigarrow t' \wedge u \prec s \wedge t \prec t')$$

That is, there exists a message which was sent by  $P_{s.p}$  before  $s$  and received by  $P_{t.p}$  after  $t$ .

**Lemma 1** *Assume FIFO.*  $\forall s, t : s.p \neq t.p : s \not\rightarrow t \wedge \neg msg(s, t) \Rightarrow t.q[s.p] = s.q[s.p]$ .

The following Lemma is crucial in proving the safety property.

**Lemma 2**  $\forall s, t : s.p \neq t.p : s \not\rightarrow t \wedge s.q[s.p] < t.v[s.p] \Rightarrow t.q[s.p] = s.q[s.p]$



## Safety Property

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**Lemma 3** (Safety)  $s.p \neq t.p \wedge s||t \Rightarrow \neg(cs(s) \wedge cs(t))$ .

**Proof:** We will show that  $(s||t) \wedge cs(s) \wedge cs(t)$  implies false.

Case 1:  $t.v[s.p] < s.q[s.p] \wedge s.v[t.p] < t.q[t.p]$

We get the following cycle.

$s.q[s.p]$		
$< \{ cs(s) \wedge s.p \neq t.p \}$		
$s.v[t.p]$	$s.v[t.p] \bullet$	$\bullet t.v[s.p]$
$< \{ \text{this case} \}$	$s.v[s.p] \bullet$	$\bullet t.v[t.p]$
$t.q[t.p]$	$s.q[t.p] \bullet$	$\bullet t.q[s.p]$
$< \{ cs(t) \wedge s.p \neq t.p \}$	$s.q[s.p] \bullet$	$\bullet t.q[t.p]$
$t.v[s.p]$		
$< \{ \text{this case} \}$		
$s.q[s.p].$		

## Safety Property [Contd.]

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Case 2:  $s.q[s.p] < t.v[s.p] \wedge t.q[t.p] < s.v[t.p]$

We get the following cycle.

$$\begin{array}{l}
 s.q[s.p] \\
 < \{ cs(s) \wedge s.p \neq t.p \} \\
 s.q[t.p] \\
 = \{ t.q[t.p] < s.v[t.p], t \not\rightarrow s, \text{ Lemma 2} \} \\
 t.q[t.p] \\
 < \{ cs(t) \wedge s.p \neq t.p \} \\
 t.q[s.p] \\
 = \{ s.q[s.p] < t.v[s.p], s \not\rightarrow t, \text{ Lemma 2} \} \\
 s.q[s.p].
 \end{array}
 \begin{array}{ll}
 & s.v[t.p] \bullet \\
 & s.v[s.p] \bullet \\
 & s.q[t.p] \bullet \\
 & s.q[s.p] \bullet \\
 & \\
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 & \\
 & t.v[s.p] \bullet \\
 & t.v[t.p] \bullet \\
 & t.q[s.p] \bullet \\
 & t.q[t.p] \bullet
 \end{array}$$

## Safety Property [Contd.]

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Case 3:  $s.q[s.p] < t.v[s.p] \wedge s.v[t.p] < t.q[t.p]$

We get the following cycle.

$$\begin{array}{l}
 s.q[s.p] \\
 < \{ cs(s) \wedge s.p \neq t.p \} \\
 s.v[t.p] \\
 < \{ \text{this case} \} \\
 t.q[t.p] \\
 < \{ cs(t) \wedge s.p \neq t.p \} \\
 t.q[s.p] \\
 = \{ s.q[s.p] < t.v[s.p], s \not\rightarrow t, \text{Lemma 2} \} \\
 s.q[s.p].
 \end{array}
 \qquad
 \begin{array}{ll}
 s.v[t.p] \bullet & \bullet t.v[s.p] \\
 s.v[s.p] \bullet & \bullet t.v[t.p] \\
 s.q[t.p] \bullet & \bullet t.q[s.p] \\
 s.q[s.p] \bullet & \bullet t.q[t.p]
 \end{array}$$

Case 4: Similar to case 3. ■

## Liveness Property

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**Lemma 4 (Liveness)**  $req(s) \Rightarrow \exists t : s \prec t \wedge cs(t)$

**Proof:**  $req(s)$  is equivalent to  $s.q[s.p] \neq \infty$ .  $s.q[s.p] \neq \infty$  implies that there exists  $s_1 \in P_{s.p}$  such that  $s_1.v[s.p] = s.q[s.p] \wedge event(s_1) = request$ .

We show existence of the required  $t$  with the following two claims:

Claim 1:

$$\exists t_1 : \forall j \neq s.p : t_1.v[j] > s.q[s.p] \wedge s.q[s.p] = t_1.q[s.p]$$

Claim 2:

$$\exists t_2 : \forall j \neq s.p : t_2.q[j] > s.q[s.p] \wedge s.q[s.p] = t_2.q[s.p]$$

## Fairness Property

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**Lemma 5** (Fairness)  $(req\_start(s) \wedge req\_start(t) \wedge s \rightarrow t) \Rightarrow (next\_cs(s) \rightarrow next\_cs(t))$

**Proof:**

Let  $s' = next\_cs(s)$  be state in which critical section is acquired, and let  $s''$  be state which it is released. Let  $t' = next\_cs(t)$ .

Let  $r$  be the state in  $P_{t.p}$  which received the request message sent from  $s$ .

## Fairness Property [Contd.]

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We know the following facts:

1.  $r \preceq t$ , due to FIFO channels.
2.  $t.v[t.p] = t.q[t.p]$ , due to request event at  $t$ .
3.  $s.v[s.p] < t.v[t.p]$ , since  $s \rightarrow t$  (*DD2*).
4.  $s.q[s.p] = s.v[s.p]$ , due to request event at  $s$ .
5.  $r.q[s.p] = s.q[s.p]$ , due to receiving request at  $r$ .
6.  $r.q[s.p] < t.q[t.p]$ , from 2, 3, 4, 5.
7.  $t.q[t.p] = t'.q[t.p]$ , by defn of  $t'$ .
8.  $t'.q[t.p] \leq t'.q[s.p]$ , since  $cs(t')$ .
9.  $r.q[s.p] < t'.q[t.p] \leq t'.q[s.p]$ , from 6, 7, 8.

This means that  $q[s.p]$  must be increased between  $r$  and  $t'$ .

That can only happen when  $P_{t.p}$  receives the release message sent from  $s''$ . Thus  $s'' \rightarrow t'$ . And since  $s' \rightarrow s''$ , we conclude  $s' \rightarrow t'$ . ■