2013 Proc. IEEE Global Conf. on Signal and Information Processing,
Dec. 3-5, 2013, Austin, Texas, USA.
A Combined Symmetric Difference and Power Monitoring GNSS Anti-Spoofing Technique
Kyle D. Wesson,
Brian L. Evans and
Todd E. Humphreys
Wireless Networking and Communications Group,
The University of Texas at Austin,
Austin, Texas USA
kyle.wesson@utexas.edu -
bevans@ece.utexas.edu -
todd.humphreys@utexas.edu
Paper Draft
Journal Version
Radionavigation Security Research at UT Austin
Abstract
Civil Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals are vulnerable
to spoofing attacks that deceive a victim receiver into reporting
counterfeit position or time information.
The primary contribution of this paper is a non-cryptographic GNSS
anti-spoofing technique that "sandwiches" a spoofer between a correlation
function distortion monitor and a total in-band power monitor.
The defense exploits the difficulty of mounting an effective spoofing
attack that simultaneously maintains a low-enough counterfeit signal
power to avoid power monitoring alarms while minimizing distortions
of the received crosscorrelation profile that are indicative of a
spoofing attack.
Results presented in this paper demonstrate the defense's effectiveness
against a sophisticated spoofing attack.
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