2013 Proc. IEEE Global Conf. on Signal and Information Processing, Dec. 3-5, 2013, Austin, Texas, USA.

A Combined Symmetric Difference and Power Monitoring GNSS Anti-Spoofing Technique

Kyle D. Wesson, Brian L. Evans and Todd E. Humphreys

Wireless Networking and Communications Group, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas USA
kyle.wesson@utexas.edu - bevans@ece.utexas.edu - todd.humphreys@utexas.edu

Paper Draft

Journal Version

Radionavigation Security Research at UT Austin


Civil Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals are vulnerable to spoofing attacks that deceive a victim receiver into reporting counterfeit position or time information. The primary contribution of this paper is a non-cryptographic GNSS anti-spoofing technique that "sandwiches" a spoofer between a correlation function distortion monitor and a total in-band power monitor. The defense exploits the difficulty of mounting an effective spoofing attack that simultaneously maintains a low-enough counterfeit signal power to avoid power monitoring alarms while minimizing distortions of the received crosscorrelation profile that are indicative of a spoofing attack. Results presented in this paper demonstrate the defense's effectiveness against a sophisticated spoofing attack.

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Last Updated 04/06/17.